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From the 1930s until the 1950s the Waterside Workers Union was at the centre of industrial life in 
New Zealand. The union was repeatedly in battle with Government and employers over wages and 
conditions and had made solidarity its byword, both at home and overseas. The wharfies were at the 
forefront in the battle against the Cold War, anti-communist drive set in train by the Fraser 
Government and taken up with gusto by the National Government under Sid Holland. The final battle 
in 1951 ranks as one of the defining moments of New Zealand's history in the twentieth century, as 
the forces of labour and capital were pitched against each other in a fight to the finish. 
 
In this book, Harold "Jock" Barnes tells the story of these events as they happened, from the day of 
his arrival on the waterfront in 1935 to the 1951 lockout and the destruction of the old union. Jock's 
account of life on the waterfront can be ignored by no-one. The man was at the centre of it all, from 
internal tussles for leadership of the union to moments of great national crisis. Jock Barnes name was 
heard everywhere from Cabinet room to children's nursery - mothers used to warn their fractious 
children that "Jock Barnes will come and get you if you don't settle down and go to sleep!". 
 
The wharfies union was once one of New Zealand's largest and most powerful unions. Holding a 
central role in the export of agricultural and pastoral products and the import of manufactures and 
fertilisers, the nation's 8,000 waterfront workers were in a critical position to affect economic activity 
throughout the country. From hesitant and uncertain beginnings in the 1880s, the wharfies built up 
their unions, saw them beaten back down again, only to rebuild them again stronger than ever (Roth, 
1993). The waterfront drew in workers from all backgrounds: there were communists and Catholics, 
skilled and unskilled, native-born and immigrant, Pakeha and Maori. 
 
While varied in every other way, one common feature that the wharfies shared which took them 
through the tumultuous times was a unity forged around continuous battles with the bosses. In the 
early decades, this meant the shipowners, but from 1940 onwards the wharfies also had to contend 
with the Waterfront Commission and Government. The main shipowners operating to and from New 
Zealand were a mercenary, profit-driven cabal, comprising a British owners' conference line, 
Benmacow (consisting of Shaw Savill and Albion, the New Zealand Shipping Company, Port Line 
and the Blue Star Line), and the major local company, the Union Steamship Shipping Company (USS 
Co.) (owned by the British P&O Company) (Green, 1992: 102-103). Profits were always protected at 
the expense of waterside safety and even the most basic canteen or washing amenities for wharfies.  
 
The shipping companies invariably sought out tough ex-military men to manage their New Zealand 
waterfront operations (Green, 1996: 22), and this factor is commented on by Barnes who notes the 
public school, "born to rule" mentality of those whom he encountered (see Lowenstein and Hills, 
1982, and Sheridan, 1995; 1996 for very similar accounts in Australia). The word of the boss was law 
and, although the union was able to gain control of overall recruitment to the workforce, under the 
"auction-block" system foremen were free to pick who was actually engaged on any given day. The 
shipowners had no compunction in requiring men to front up for work at six in the morning, sit on 
their haunches for three hours over the engagement period and, if still not hired, to wait around until 
lunchtime when the same process could be repeated. The man then had to return home with the entire 
day wasted and not a penny earned. In these circumstances favouritism was rife and, until 1937 when 
the auction block was replaced by the Bureau system of engagement, union activism commonly meant 
missing out on the best jobs or the chances for overtime. 
 
The cost of a ship lying idle on the wharves was prohibitive, and the prime concern for the shipowner 
was to turn the ship around and get it back to sea. Work was dirty, hard, and frequently unsafe. The 
worst jobs were slag, lime and guano, but many others were regarded as obnoxious to handle. Bulk 
cargoes were stacked together in paper bags which often rotted. Jock describes the campaign for 
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bonuses to handle lampblack (used for blackening tyres), but the union was also concerned for its men 
working in freezer hatches and elsewhere. Hernias and injuries of all kinds were common, and cuts 
and bruises just part of the daily work. In Auckland alone in 1938, more than 1,300 injuries were 
reported to the shipowners association, arising mostly from problems in handling cargo and being 
struck by falling or swinging loads (Green, 1994: 154). At any one time roughly one-third of all 
watersiders could be expected to be on accident compensation at some point during the year (Green, 
1994: 154). 
 
The one constant in all statements from the shipowners throughout the entire period is their complaint 
that work standards were slipping, that pilferage was rampant, and that discipline needed to be 
restored to the waterfront. This refrain was maintained in times when the owners had complete 
control, as they did in 1915, and also when their "rights" were under siege, as they were in the 1940s. 
It was heard during the post-war years, when spelling (men in gangs taking breaks in turn) was 
widespread, just as it was when it was non-existent, as during the war itself. None of the Auckland 
waterfront problems, of course, were due to abysmal facilities for the handling of cargo and the 
primitive levels of mechanisation. It was only with the arrival of American troops in 1942 that the 
Auckland waterfront was completely shaken up in this respect and this "can-do" mentality lies behind 
the respect evinced by Barnes towards the American top brass (Roth, 1993: 84). 
 
Despite the shipowners' complaints, the city's wharves radically increased the amount of cargo 
handled from the time of Jock's arrival on the Auckland waterfront in 1935 to the 1951 lockout. Partly 
this was due to the War, partly it was due to a decision of the shipowners to reduce the number of 
ports called in at by ocean-going ships. Employment increased by two-thirds, with the result that 
Auckland went from having just over half the number of wharfies as worked in Wellington during 
World War One (967 as against 1,735), to ten per cent more (2,000 as against  1,840) 35 years later 
(Green, 1996: 34). The pressure of work explains the importance attached by shipowners and 
government to industrial discipline on the wharves. This placed a tremendous burden on the men, and 
long working hours became the norm after the mid-1930s, most especially during the War. Twelve-
hour shifts were worked and work continued right through until 10 pm. Men worked 60, 70 or even 
80 hours for weeks at a time. 
 
In the face of hostility from the entire industrial Establishment and even from other unions, the 
Auckland wharfies developed a tremendous esprit de corps (see Sheridan 1994 for similar accounts of 
Australian wharfies). This was evident in the solidarity evident in 1951, with barely two dozen scabs 
being recruited from their number. But it was obvious well before '51 and made their opponents 
reckon them up as tough adversaries. The group cohesion, manifest in the nicknames, their close 
working-class communities, the drinking in the same pubs, the following of sons into their father's 
trade, helped make the wharfies something of a "race apart", in the words of academics Kerr and 
Siegel (1954: 191).  
 
The worst sin on the waterfront was to be a scab. Once tainted, the mark was on a man for life. Jock 
notes that with the union in charge of hiring the waterfront workforce, good "industrial character" was 
the number one requirement for engagement, and this ensured that workers who had been blacked 
from other industries for union activity were eligible for jobs on the waterfront. Like attracted like, 
and by the 1930s the wharfies included many old Waihi men, seamen and other survivors of past 
industrial battles (Roth, 1993). 
 
It was this camaraderie that enabled the wharfies over time to win a series of improvements to their 
working conditions: the right to decide who should be employed on the waterfront, the right to decide 
whether to work in the rain, a limitation on the amount of overtime, regulation of the pace of work 
and the weight of slings, and payment for handling obnoxious cargo. Particularly under Barnes' 
leadership, the union preferred direct bargaining and strike action to arbitration and conciliation. 
Through pressure of this kind in the 1940s, the union won an increased guaranteed wage and annual 
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holidays, the right to refuse work deemed to be unsafe by wharfies themselves, and improved canteen 
and waiting room facilities on the Auckland waterfront. 
 
Conditions of work were very similar across the industry, with every worker on the award rate and not 
a penny more: wage increases therefore had to be fought for nationally, and wharfies therefore 
understood the importance of their national union. The wharfies resisted piecework and productivity 
bonus schemes proposed by employers in the 1930s and 1940s that would only have split up their 
collective identity. More controversially, rank and file members also rejected "co-operative 
stevedoring" that would have seen some of their number effectively become managers of others. 
 
The union won these gains primarily by exercising their industrial muscle. In the post-war years the 
loss of man hours due to industrial conflict increased nearly tenfold (Green, 1996: 185). Auckland of 
course was at the centre of the agitation. Nearly three-quarters of all waterfront disputes in the post-
war years were in this port. Nearly one-quarter of all hours of stoppage concerned disputes about dirt 
rates (the lampblack disputes), 18 per cent concerned danger rates (for example the dispute over tetra-
ethyl of lead on the Barnhill), 12 per cent concerned spelling, and 11 per cent were over safety issues 
(such as the Mountpark case) (Green, 1996: 187). The continuous battle of wills between the wharfies 
union and the Waterfront Commission accounted for a further 21 per cent of hours lost. In this book 
Jock covers all of these episodes and more. 
 
The union packed a powerful punch because it was not only democratic in structure, participatory in 
nature, but also actively controlled by its members. Monthly stopwork meetings, which all members 
were required to attend, were held in the Port Buildings and, when the numbers attending grew close 
to 2,000, were then moved to the Town Hall. Meetings could last up to four or five hours. Branch 
officials were elected by secret ballot and members of the Auckland branch executive were regularly 
overturned, with the balance swinging both Left and Right in the 1940s. It was not just an Auckland 
affair, of course. In 1949 a stopwork meeting was held at Lyttelton at which Barnes spoke for two 
hours, the national secretary Toby Hill for one, followed by three hours of question and debate. 
 
The union's paper, Transport Worker, played a key role in informing members of union affairs and 
was edited by Dick Scott, who went on to become a professional writer of some repute. The paper was 
not just educational: it also served to mobilise the membership. It was a paper that campaigned, with 
full coverage of every issue of the day, whether it was the conscription referendum, shipowners' 
profits, battles over lampblack, a general election, Fintan Patrick Walsh's post-war anti-socialist 
"stabilisation policy", or the split from the Federation of Labour (FOL). The paper did not shy away 
from history and included articles on the Red Federation of Labour and the early days of the labour 
movement. Contemporary Labour leaders were embarrassed by the regular reprints of their statements 
on the restrictive nature of the arbitration system, to which they had now become enthusiastic 
converts. In addition to the newspaper, the union also had an active publicity machine, and when 
under attack from either the Labour or National Government or the Waterfront Commission, issued 
tens of thousands of pamphlets putting its case to the wider labour movement. The union also ran 
massive public meetings of a kind that any New Zealand union today would find impossible. 
 
All of this took place in the face of consistent abuse from the Fraser Labour Government which 
regarded Barnes and the Auckland wharfies as "deliberate enemies prepared to wreck the Government 
to enforce their own will" (Green, 1996: 192). Perhaps ironically, at the same time as mercilessly 
criticising the Labour Party, the union was affiliated to the Party and contributed more money to it 
than any other union. Transport Worker campaigned for Labour in all elections and gave over its front 
page in 1949 to an election message from Fraser. 
 
The union was concerned not just with the immediate interests of its members but took a broader 
perspective as well. Jock talks about the campaign to ban the shipment of iron ore to Japan during its 
invasion of China. He also discusses the campaigns to expose the Food for Britain fraud and to stop 
the shipment of butter to the United States, which so embarrassed the Government that it was forced 
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to step in. Transport Worker featured many articles attacking the Cold War politics of Fraser's 
government and its Tory successor, and in 1949 campaigned with Frank Langstone and others to 
oppose conscription in 1949. At a time when rugby was the religion of the country, the union argued 
that it was better that the Tour to South Africa be scrapped than that Maoris be excluded from the 
team. Like their brothers across the Tasman, New Zealand wharfies also blacked Dutch shipping to 
Indonesia during the anti-colonial struggle of the post-war years. They also refused to load wool for 
Franco's Spain. At home they were solid friends of workers in the freezing works and on the 
Mangakino hydro project, and also of Auckland carpenters and railway workers. 
 
The wharfies political platform was wide-ranging. They wanted the building of luxury dwellings 
banned. They wanted a programme of cheap housing introduced, paid for with the money saved by 
scrapping Royal Tours and Defence Forces armaments. They wanted pensioners to be paid the same 
as MPs, prices to be frozen pending progressive reduction, equal pay for equal work, abolition of 
wage discrimination based on sex, the nationalisation of key national resources and industries, and a 
minimum wage for all. 
 
Although this is the story of an all-male workforce, all records of the 1951 lockout bring out the role 
of the wharfies' wives and girlfriends. Although the hardships of the lockout broke up many families, 
for the most part the women supported their men to the bitter end. This support did not just materialise 
out of thin air, but had been consciously built by the union in preceding years. Families were involved 
in the life of the waterfront, not just because many lived close by to the wharves but also because the 
union organised a Ladies Committee, which looked after many social and welfare matters. The union 
also organised a hospital comforts fund, regular bucket collections to help out members in distress 
and, from 1942, a sickness fund. The union also involved families through its massively popular 
annual picnic days, which drew crowds of up to 10,000 and featured sports contests of all types, and 
even glamour contests for both men and women! All of these activities paid dividends in the course of 
the lockout, as the Ladies Committee was transformed into the Women's Auxiliary which helped the 
men by taking part in demonstrations, by harassing scabs and the wives of scabs, as well as more 
traditional activities such as preparation of food in relief depots.  
 
As Dean Parker has written, the wharfies union “didn’t just have militancy, it had a real culture” 
(personal communication). The union had members actively involved in sports competitions. Jock 
notes his own interests in sports at school and he was certainly not alone. The kind of physique 
capable of withstanding tough work on the waterfront was also that required for inter-port rugby 
competitions. There were also soccer, cricket, swimming, boxing and wrestling teams, which took 
part in competitions across the country. Not just the body but the mind also was attended to by the 
union. Jock comments on the success of the union's pipe bands, but the union also had a highly 
successful debating team, a drama group and a chess club. 
 
Finally, of course, it is important to recognise that the battle between the wharfies and the industrial 
establishment was not simply the result of a personal vendetta between Jock Barnes and the world, as 
is sometimes implied in accounts of the time. Indeed, in Auckland the struggle involved all of the 
2,000 men on the Auckland waterfront, the vast majority of whom stayed loyal to the union for five 
long months in 1951. The national stature of Barnes was the result not just of his character and 
abilities, impressive though they were, but most importantly the industrial muscle of the wharfies 
themselves. It was the wharfies who proved that a union leader is only as powerful as the members 
whom he or she represents. That was why the New Zealand Herald's campaign against the union 
sought to demonise wharfies as a whole, while not stinting in its continuous character assassination of 
Barnes himself. The close connection between members and leadership was regularly reaffirmed at 
the monthly stopwork meetings. 
 
Jock Barnes’ career also proves the rule (by exception) that established labour movement leaders tend 
to react violently to any from within their own ranks or from outside who threaten the stability of the 
industrial status quo. His major labour movement opponents in the 1940s and 1950s were all former 
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radicals who had now made their peace with the system. F.P. Walsh and Ken Baxter from the 
Federation of Labour and Labour Party leaders and ministers Paddy Webb, Bob Semple, Angus 
McLagan, Peter Fraser, and Jim Roberts all fall into this category. And some had done very well out 
of their accommodation to the system. Although the true story will perhaps always be shrouded in 
mystery, Walsh held numerous official union and government posts, died a rich man, and was a figure 
for whom De Leon's phrase "labour lieutenant of capital" might well have been coined (De Leon, 
1904). It was no accident that rank and file seamen ignored Walsh as their union secretary throughout 
1951 and struck in support of the wharfies (Scott, 1952: 73-76; Bollinger, 19xx: 226-32). 
 
By contrast, Barnes was a working official for his entire time as president of the Auckland branch 
(1944-49). When the national presidency of the union finally became a full-time position, Barnes was 
paid less than many union members. In 1949, when the salary was first introduced, his weekly wage 
of £7.10 was ten shillings less than "his" members got for a 40 hour week at four shillings per hour. 
Working on the job made him intimately aware of the needs of members. How this contrasts with 
many of today's union officials who are not only full-time office workers, may never have worked in 
the industry in which they are industrially active and, indeed, may never have held a full-time job 
outside the union movement after leaving university! 
 
And while Walsh and FOL President Croskery's power base lay in the voting bloc represented by the 
industrial conscript clerical and shop assistant unions, Barnes' leadership was always contestable. To 
win the branch presidency, Barnes had to defeat the Jim Roberts machine. Roberts, "the uncrowned 
king of New Zealand", had been the dominant figure in the union since the 1910s. Like so many other 
union leaders, however, on the election of the 1935 Savage Government Roberts forsook his union 
loyalties in favour of his allegiances  to the Labour Party, of which he was now president. It was no 
mean feat defeating such a man and once in office, Barnes was still not without opposition. The 
national union was not a monolith, and the various branches jealously guarded their autonomy. Rows 
with the Wellington branch over the issue of Commission control versus direct action were common, 
as indeed were they within the Auckland branch. At times Barnes crossed swords with Toby Hill and 
with Alec Drennan within the militant wing of the branch, and also with Noel Donaldson and others 
amongst the Labour loyalists. Despite these differences, Barnes maintained the loyalty of the 
Auckland branch despite continuous efforts by the Labour Party and FOL to unseat him.  
 
Whatever one's interpretation of Jock Barnes, there is no doubt that the times made the man. What his 
opponents regarded as his bloodymindedness was held by his supporters to be intransigent defence of 
the needs of the average wharfie in the face of united opposition from all corners. From the daily 
barbs of Herald cartoonist Minhinnick, to the continuous attacks from F.P. Walsh and Minister of 
Labour Angus McLagan, Barnes was attacked not so much as the man he was but for what he 
represented: a body of 2,000 men on the Auckland waterfront who were a permanent obstacle to 
wartime regulations, post-war "stabilisation", and US military designs in Asia.  
 
The 1951 defeat was a tragedy not just for the many wharfies who were blacklisted or cast to the four 
winds but for the New Zealand labour movement and, indeed, New Zealand society more generally. 
The defeat of the wharfies ushered in more than twenty years of nearly uninterrupted conservative 
rule which secured for New Zealand an image as an intellectual and political backwater, locked into 
the British monarchy, rigid social and sexual mores, and fierce hostility to anything that might upset 
this idyll. Only in the late 1960s, when the labour movement finally shook off the shackles that 
Barnes' adversaries had so keenly locked upon it, did New Zealand society start to come alive again, 
not just industrially, but socially and politically as well. This wave too has passed and the country 
now suffers from a culture which knows the price of everything but the value of nothing. Only when 
the labour movement recovers the spirit that animated the militant unions of the 1940s and again in 
the late 1960s and 1970s will New Zealand's workers once again stand tall. Barnes' account in this 




OTHER ACCOUNTS OF "THE BARNES ERA" 
 
There are two levels at which the great struggles on the waterfront can be understood (Green, 1996). 
The dominant and more traditional is the political-institutional, which sees 1951 as a Cold War battle 
between militant unionists, who renounced arbitration in favour of direct action on the job, and 
Government and mainstream union leaders who were determined to gain the upper hand in the battle 
for "industrial order" and postwar stability. Within this paradigm can be found work both critical of 
and sympathetic towards Barnes and the wharfies union. The critics include Gordon (1951), written 
by a serving officer of the National Party. The main supportive account is that by Dick Scott (1952), 
editor of Transport Worker, both of which being written by those closely involved in events and 
immediately after the dispute. The accounts by W.B. Sutch (1966), Michael Bassett (1972) and Bert 
Roth (1974; 1986; 1993), written many years after the event, are somewhat more distant from the 
events but are again written from the basic political-institutional perspective.  
 
The second approach to 1951 takes the focus away from the Holland Government and Federation of 
Labour and puts the spotlight onto the shipowners and the struggle for control over the labour process 
on the waterfront. Anna Green in particular portrays 1951 as the culmination of a 30-year battle of 
this nature (Green, 1996). From a situation of near total dominance of waterfront affairs in 1915, the 
shipowners were forced by union pressure to retreat in a range of areas, including the allocation of 
labour, safety issues, manning arrangements, discipline, forms of payment, and weekend work. The 
election of the Holland Government in November 1949 and the gathering pace of the Cold War gave 
the shipowners the environment to confront the union and make up all the ground lost in previous 
decades. In Green's account, the Cold War factors are only background context for the main battle 
between employers and union. 
 
The editor regards both these approaches as valid. The history of capitalism is the history of struggle 
at the point of production between capital and labour. As already mentioned, the key issue faced by 
the shipowners was rapid turnaround time, and this impressed upon them the need for close 
surveillance, particularly as regards spelling. To the extent that accounts of 1951 ignore this factor 
(e.g. Woods, 1963), they are clearly weakened. However, to sideline the political-institutional level is 
also problematic. The postwar years witnessed attempts by shipowners and governments to smash 
militant unionism on the waterfront and on the ships, not just in Auckland, but also on the West Coast 
of the United States, in London and Liverpool, and in Melbourne, Brisbane and Sydney. This was not 
merely coincidence but reflected the times: the postwar years were ones of titanic struggles between 
organised labour and Western governments as part of the Cold War drive. Politics was entirely 
polarised: Reds were not only under the bed but most probably in it as well. Labour Governments in 
New Zealand, Britain and Australia all signed up as loyal partners in America's attempt to snuff out all 
labour agitation on their side of the Cold War fence. Dockers on the waterfront in East London, 
metalworkers in Melbourne and carpenters in Auckland all felt the effects. They were not alone: 
workers in Nissan factories in Japan, farm labourers in Southern Italy, and railway workers in France 
also felt the lash. And in every case, Government politicians, social democratic, liberal or 
conservative, found allies in the union bureaucracy. F.P. Walsh, Angus McLagan and Ken Baxter had 
their brothers in Lord Citrine and Arthur Deakin in Britain, Walter Reuther and Phillip Murray in the 
United States, and Albert Monk in Australia. Similarly in the Eastern Bloc, where genuinely socialist, 
syndicalist or otherwise non-Stalinist currents in the labour movement were either crushed or driven 
underground in this period (Harman, 1983). 
 
The strength of Jock's account of his time on the waterfront is that he deals with both the broader 
political context of the time, including his titanic tussles with the Federation of Labour and the Fraser 
Labour and Holland National Governments, but also details the on-the-job struggles waged by 
wharfies in their bid to wrest job control away from the shipowners. Jock describes how the union 
won the right to work in safe conditions, to have some control over manning rates and to work 
unmolested by American troops on the wharves. The ability to combine differing levels of analysis is 
one of the key strengths of Never a White Flag. 
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The debates over Barnes' tactics 
 
Key Criticisms 
The story of the New Zealand waterfront in the middle part of the 20th century is as controversial in 
its telling as it was in its living. Roth (1993: 143) has outlined some of the key issues at stake: 
Much has been written about the 1951 dispute, much has been argued. Could the 
defeat have been avoided by more flexible tactics, by making greater efforts to win 
friends in the forthcoming confrontation, by more willingness to compromise when 
retreat was the only alternative to total destruction? 
 
Let us deal with each of these questions in turn. The mainstream interpretation of 1951 is that it 
represents proof that simple industrial muscle cannot prevail over the forces of state and employers 
combined. This was a lesson learned from the failed waterfront dispute of 1890-91, and the defeat of 
the Waihi coal miners and the Red Federation of Labour in 1912-1913. As Olssen (1986: 25) has 
argued: 
Defeat was inevitable ... Most unionists already knew that no union, or combination 
of unions, could defeat an elected government which chose to fight back. After 1951, 
all grasped the point. 
 
The only way out for the wharfies by 1951 was some form of compromise with the Government, FOL 
Executive and shipowners.  
 
Defeat was inevitable for the wharfies and compromise essential, the critics claim, because the union 
was isolated, even within the Trade Union Congress. Roth points out that neither carpenters nor 
Auckland labourers helped the wharfies' cause in 1951, and only in Wellington did freezing workers 
and drivers took action. Railway workers only refused to handle scab goods rather than strike, while 
in Christchurch, a city with a strong TUC profile, not a single union struck in support. 
 
Such isolation was avoidable. Roth is a keen exponent of the view that Barnes deliberately isolated 
the wharfies from the mainstream, cared not for the consequences, and thereby ensured the destruction 
of the union. According to Roth (1986: 138): 
Barnes and Hill ... had no qualms about causing a split in the New Zealand 
movement. They had a blind faith in the power of their union and believed that the 
watersiders alone, without any allies could fight and defeat the shipowners and the 
government. 
 
By refusing to apologise for the damning letter sent to the FOL Executive over the carpenters 
deregistration, Barnes "was intent upon a break" and "walked into this trap without any prodding" 
(Roth, 1986: 130-31). In splitting from the FOL "Barnes chose glorious self-destruction" (Roth, 1986: 
138) and, "By his super-militant tactics, Barnes effectively isolated his union and forfeited what 
public sympathy remained for the watersiders, but there is no evidence that he was either aware of or 
concerned about this" (Roth, 1974: 74). Unlike many union leaders of the time, Barnes had the full 
support of union members, but "he repaid their magnificent loyalty by leading them to defeat and 
destruction" (Roth, 1974: 78). Similarly, Sinclair in his biography of Nash argues that by forming the 
TUC, the wharfies union "isolated themselves from the general union movement and sat out on a 
limb, waiting to be cut off. But of this they seemed entirely unaware" (Sinclair, 1976: 282). 
 
This strategic failure is apparently rooted in Barnes' personality. His "consuming personal hatred of 
Walsh, McLagan and other Labour politicians made it difficult for him to judge issues 
dispassionately, and Walsh by cleverly exploiting Barnes's weakness was able to manoeuvre him and 
his union into a position of increasing isolation" (Roth, 1974: 71). Roth is not alone in this 
assessment. Bassett (1972) argues that the wharfies union selfishly put its interests above those of the 
broader labour movement (represented by the FOL Executive) and that it was being driven by Barnes' 
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desire for revenge. Barnes was motivated by deep political beliefs but was also "a man seeking 
retribution" against his enemies who deserted him in his fight for reinstatement to his public service 
job in the 1930s. Barnes was, moreover, a man hungry for the spotlight (Bassett, 1972: 20; 41; 47). 
Similarly Kevin Ireland, promoting his novel based on the 1951 lockout, describes Barnes as "a mass 
of grudges ... capable of carrying the wharfies to their doom" (Auckland Sunday Star, 7 April 1996). 
 
Such criticism comes not just from Barnes's strongest critics but also those who were his allies in 
1951. Jim Healy from the Australian waterside union and the New Zealand Communist Party both 
argued at the time or soon afterwards that the union should have taken steps to ensure that it was not 
expelled from the FOL in 1950 (Roth, 1986: 133; NZCP, 1952). The split needlessly isolated the 
militants from the "moderates", and prepared the way for the decimation of the union. 
 
Some Responses 
There are several arguments that can be made in Barnes' defence regarding strategy and tactics in the 
period leading up to the lockout and during the lockout itself. First, what would a compromise with 
the Holland Government (and FOL) have entailed? The Government's seven conditions for a peace 
plan in 1951 which are set out in Jock's memoirs involved serious concessions by the union. Some 
were accepted immediately, but some involved giving up key industrial gains that had been made in 
the previous decade or two at the cost of immense sacrifice in wages and hardship. One such 
condition was the Government's insistence that the watersiders submit all their industrial claims to 
binding arbitration chaired by a Government appointee. Since the early 1940s the wharfies had waged 
a series of industrial campaigns which were eventually successful in removing this very requirement, 
in the form of intervention by the Waterfront Commission. This Commission, Jock argues in his 
memoirs, consistently worked against the wharfies' interests. The second major sticking point was the 
Government's demand that waterfront employment be "opened up", i.e. to end union control over the 
selection of waterfront labour. The outcome of such a move would have been the reinstitution of the 
favouritism and patronage associated with the worst aspects of the "auction-block" system.  
 
These demands appeared quite unacceptable to the wharfies in the early days of the lockout, and were 
rejected in meetings in every major port. Nonetheless, after the lockout had dragged on for two 
months the wharfies national executive was compelled to accept them. Nash, who had prevailed upon 
them to do so, was exuberant. The following day, however, Holland added an eighth condition, 
demonstrating the Government's real intentions for those who had not read the earlier signs. The 
Government now insisted that the deregistered national union be broken up and replaced by the newly 
registered scab port unions. This, of course, had been the Government's (and the FOL's) real agenda 
right from the start. In his memoirs, Sir Jack Marshall, New Zealand Prime Minister in the early 1970s 
and a member of the Holland Government in 1951, noted of the lockout: 
The specific issues ... could have been settled in a few weeks if we had been willing 
to allow the old leaders to return to run the old union ... [but] we were determined to 
get rid of the militant troublemakers and to break up the national union (Roth, 1993: 
143) 
 
And so, just three weeks into the dispute, the Minister of Labour, Bill Sullivan, had refused to 
recognise Barnes and Hill as WWU negotiators, and two days later, F.P. Walsh had called for 
wharfies to join the scab unions when they were established and to dump Barnes and Hill. Holland's 
announcement of the eighth condition was merely confirmation of this underlying goal. 
 
The destruction of the national union and the removal of Barnes and Hill would not just have been a 
misfortune for these two personalities. It would also have meant widespread victimisation of all those 
loyal to the old leadership and the promotion of those, such as Noel Donaldson, who went on to play a 
leading role in the scab union in '51. This is clear from the situation at New Plymouth where the 
leading militants of the old union were refused work by the shipowners in the "screening" process 
after the branch independently voted to return to work early after a scab union was established. As 
Roth notes (1993: 143) "Obviously this would have happened in Auckland too". 
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Objecting to the Government's escalating conditions was not selfishness on the part of the national 
leadership, but represented a stout defence of the gains made through extensive sacrifices over the 
preceding 30 years. Had Barnes and Hill conceded in the obliteration of the national union, their 
names would have been dirt in the New Zealand labour movement ever after. Their refusal to 
compromise, furthermore, was backed repeatedly by the 2,000 Auckland wharfies who voted support 
to the national leadership throughout the 151 days, even in the most difficult circumstances.  
 
Neither the shipowners, nor the FOL Executive, nor the Government  wanted a compromise. All were 
out to smash the wharfies union, and whether the showdown came over the 1950 wage case or over 
the handling of obnoxious cargoes or over spelling was immaterial to them. On 30 November 1950, 
shipowner's representative Belford (Union Steamship Company) had admitted at the waterfront Royal 
Commission that a showdown with the union was likely (Scott, 1952: 15). The FOL Executive was 
equally adamant. It had already destroyed the carpenters union and in 1951 it took on the wharfies. 
Even the destruction of these two unions did not satisfy the appetite of F.P. Walsh and friends, whose 
red-baiting did not let up for another seven years until he was outflanked even further to the right by 
Peter Butler of the Labourers Union in the late 1950s. 
 
As for the political parties, Labour's Prime Minister Peter Fraser had referred to the wharfies as 
"political blacklegs" at a special conference of the FOL early in 1947 (Bassett, 1972: 218), while 
Labour's Minister of Works, Bob Semple, was even more direct, accusing "Mr Barnes and his 
ratbags" of being "a real threat to the industrial peace and general welfare of the people of this 
country" (Bassett, 1972: 26). Labour's successors were no less forthcoming. Minister of Labour Bill 
Sullivan argued that "Their wings have to be clipped or the system as we know it will fade and die", 
while Sid Holland declared that the country was "actually at war" and was facing "a very determined 
effort to overthrow orderly government by force" (Sinclair, 1976: 283). In this effort to maintain 
order, National was backed up in large measure by most leading Labour Party figures, with even the 
avowedly conciliatory Nash admitting that a Labour Government too would have used the Emergency 
Regulations. Indeed, Nash's attempt to bring about a compromise deal with the Government during 
the lockout and his "neither for nor against" approach only gave the Government greater confidence 
that the wharfies would be left to fight without any support from Labour (see Scott, 1952, Chapter 9 
for more on the role of the Labour Party). 
 
The level of determination of labour leaders, businessmen and Cabinet to crush the wharfies can also 
be demonstrated by the money that they were prepared to spend in this endeavour: up to £100 million, 
an enormous sum in those days. Given all these facts, the argument that some clever manoeuvre could 
have avoided the final confrontation is untenable, 
 
What of the "isolation" of the wharfies in 1951? Was this deliberate, was it welcomed, and in what 
way was the union actually isolated? That Barnes and his allies welcomed isolation is a bizarre claim. 
In his memoirs, Jock repeatedly pays tribute to all those who took action alongside the watersiders in 
1951. At the peak of the campaign, up to 22,000 workers were taking action of some kind. This 
included in addition to the 8,000 wharfies, 7,000 freezing workers, 4,000 miners, 1,000 hydro workers 
and 500 drivers (Roth, 1974: 76). Across the Tasman port workers throughout Australia refused to 
handle New Zealand shipping. For his union's pains, Jim Healey of the Australian wharfies union was 
charged under the Crimes Act with obstructing trade and was later jailed with hard labour for 6 weeks. 
Thousands of Australian wharfies stopped work in protest and only lifted their bans at the request of 
their New Zealand counterparts who said that they found material aid more useful at that point in their 
struggle. By the end of the lockout, Australian wharfies had donated approximately £40,000 through 
weekly levies. Within New Zealand tons of food were donated by supporters despite the best efforts 




Such solidarity was anathema to the FOL Executive, which was intent on making the union a pariah 
long before the start of the lockout. Rather than the 1950 Conference walkout representing a desire for 
industrial martyrdom, the split was forced upon the union. While arguing, as we have seen, that 
Barnes "had no qualms about causing a split", Roth admits that  
The prime responsibility for the FOL-TUC split lies at the door of the Federation 
leaders who were determined to crush the left wing opposition within the movement, 
and who did not hesitate, in the 1951 dispute, to help the National Party government 
destroy the watersiders (Roth, 1986: 137). 
 
During the course of 1951 the FOL missed no opportunity to further isolate the wharfies. The 
Executive actively opposed any aid to the watersiders and demanded that solidarity strikes be ended. 
As it had done two years earlier in the case of the Carpenters, it then endorsed the formation of scab 
unions and urged locked-out wharfies to desert their union and join the scabs. By its constant 
pressure, the FOL succeeded in stampeding the railway workers back to work and forced them to 
handle scab cargoes, while striking freezing workers were whittled down to the Wellington and 
Taranaki branches. Harbour Board employees also collapsed under pressure, Auckland freezing 
workers voted to load out meat for servicemen, and drivers resumed work. Mangakino hydro workers 
voted narrowly to return to work, and a national ballot by railwaymen voted to return also. FOL 
pressure also led to Waikato open-cut miners voting to return to work. The FOL Executive mobilised 
across borders as well, linking arms with Albert Monk and Arthur Deakin, the leaders of the ACTU 
and TUC in Australia and Britain respectively, in recognition of the threat that all three faced from 
unions that were prepared to challenge the Cold War offensive against labour. The result was that 
dockers in both countries were instructed by their peak union councils to handle black cargo. Little 
wonder then, that Mr P. Harrison, then president of the Auckland Rotary Club, could comment: 
I sincerely hope that we, as employers will never forget that the last strike was not 
broken by the Government, although it did everything it could and provided the 
necessary framework. It was broken by the responsible labour unions (cited New 
Zealand Communist Party, 1952: 4) (emphasis added). 
 
To describe this situation as in any way Barnes choosing "glorious self-destruction" represents a 
complete inversion of the true situation.  
 
Barnes certainly used rhetorical bravado at times but his actions refute the notion that the man 
deliberately sought to alienate support. Even the timing of the walkout from the FOL itself reflects 
Barnes desire for his union to avoid isolation. To the extent that he had any room to manoeuvre at the 
1950 FOL Conference, the purpose of walkout was to take as many supporters as possible, rather than 
risk being left truly isolated two months after the Conference when the Executive struck its blow, as 
was undoubtedly its intention. Barnes understood that there is a great deal of difference between 
formal organisational unity of the industrial conscript unions under the banner of the FOL and the 
potential for real concrete unity that could be achieved by workers in action whether affiliated to the 
FOL or TUC. While Roth is correct in pointing to the failure of many TUC affiliates to support the 
wharfies in 1951, it is also true that miners, seamen and Mangakino hydro workers all pitched in, 
despite being affiliated to the FOL and despite the bitter opposition of their national leaders, 
Prendiville, Crook and Walsh.  
 
Furthermore, the wharfies achieved unity not just across organisational boundaries within the labour 
movement but also with other oppressed groups. The privileged students of Auckland University may 
have voted nine to one to endorse the Emergency Regulations, but the wharfies found true friends 
amongst Maori organisations and in the Combined Women's Committee.  
 
It is also worth reasserting that the wharfies could have won in 1951. Olsen's argument that "no union, 
or combination of unions, could defeat an elected government which chose to fight back" flies in the 
face of union victories against even the most repressive of governments. If all unions adopted such a 
defeatist attitude, it is unlikely that they would ever have been formed in the first place, since unions 
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across the world are frequently born in circumstances of the most bitter repression. The South African 
unionists who helped bring down apartheid by their mass strikes of the 1980s would never have 
attempted such rash action had they been so advised. The South Korean strikers would never have 
risked life and limb against vicious police and military action in 1987 and again ten years later. In 
countries much more akin to New Zealand, workers have made similar gains, Australian unions 
breaking penal clauses by general strike action in 1969 and British unions actually bringing down 
Edward Heath's Tory Government in 1974. Even in New Zealand itself, the success of the Public 
Service Association in twice forcing the Muldoon Government to withdraw deregistration bills in the 
early 1980s proves Olsen's argument wrong. 
 
We have seen the level of solidarity that was mobilised at the high point of the lockout. Wisdom after 
the event that "defeat was inevitable" reeks of smug disdain for the struggles that were waged by 
wharfies and others in that notable year. It also acts as a cover for the criminal action by the FOL 
Executive and Labour Party, who did their best to make sure that Olsen's prediction came to pass. As 
Keith Holyoake told Parliament in August 1960, the National Government had been  
... fortunate in that the FOL, the responsible workers leaders, stood firmly with the 
Government. The task would have been impossible without the Federation's aid (cited 
in Roth, 1974: 78). 
 
Finally, even if we were to concede Olsen's argument that "defeat was inevitable", would it have been 
better for the wharfies to have conceded defeat right from the start, rather than to have fought on to 
the bitter end? No union willingly goes into action acknowledging defeat, and in most cases it is better 
for a union to seek some form of compromise rather than continue with action knowing that the odds 
are stacked heavily against it. However, 1951 was not just another minor struggle in which the 
wharfies could have conceded temporarily, replenished their resources, and come back and won 
revenge at the next round. As we have seen 1951 was a year in which no compromise was possible. It 
was a year when the veil of class consensus was ripped from New Zealand politics, revealing the 
harsh reality of a bitter class conflict. Conceding in these circumstances would have meant utter 
demoralisation of the entire militant wing of the labour movement. Barnes and Hill would have been 
regarded as the worst form of cowards, as braggarts who turned and ran.  
 
This appears to be the preferred course of action for Bassett whose description of the Government's 
responses to Walter Nash's attempts to broker a compromise indicate that the Government was happy 
with nothing less than the total destruction of the union. That the wharfies still decided to resist the 
dismemberment of their union is put down to the belligerence of Barnes and "a strong sense of 
impending martyrdom" of its members (Bassett, 1972: 27). Given that their fight was doomed from 
the outset, the fact that the wharfies chose to engage in an unwinnable battle served only to 
consolidate the National Party in power and to lower the reputation of trade unions and the Labour 
Party in the eyes of the general public for years afterwards. In order to avoid "untold damage to the 
cause which workingmen still hold dear" (Bassett, 1972: 212), the union should evidently have agreed 
to its own break-up at the beginning of the year so as to avoid the awful conflict that befell all 
concerned. 
 
Now it is true that the outcome of the wharfies' defeat was significant demoralisation within the labour 
movement, evident in the electoral gains for the Holland Government later in 1951 and the years of 
industrial passivity which followed. F.P. Walsh and the arbitrationist unions had clearly beaten back 
the challenge from the threat from militant unionism and were to remain in this comfortable position 
until the revival of industrial action in the late 1960s. In this sense, Barnes' assessment at the time that 
the lockout was merely "round one" of the battle was incorrect. But the question remains: was it better 
that battle was entered into and lost rather than conceded without a single blow being landed on the 
enemy? Clearly for Bassett, the latter was preferable: it would have avoided the Labour Party being 
put on the spot at the very least. However, as Barnes was to write in reviewing Bassett's book 20 years 
after the event "We had no option as unionists and men but to fight back and make our attackers pay 
as dearly as possible. In this we succeeded" (Sunday Herald, 27 February 1972). If the union had 
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simply given in, there is no guarantee that the Holland government would not have gone amok, over-
running all the welfare measures from the Savage years.  
 
While one camp in the labour movement could draw the conclusion that the wharfies were wrong to 
fight, others could draw much more radical conclusions concerning the true friends and enemies of 
New Zealand's working class. That knowledge was essential training in the education of future 
generations of union militants and even now is instructive for those who wish to learn. As Scott 
(1952: 204) wrote: 
Thousands learned fast while the mask was sdown and tens of thousands stored 
impressions which will mature at the first stimulus of activity. The worth of secret 
ballots, the purpose of law-making, the genuineness of arbitration, the value of 
solemn undertakings, the role of the state forces - the full face of the ruling class was 
bared, the naked class basis of society exposed.  
 
We might contrast the situation with the 1990s. Forty years after the '51 lockout, the Council of Trade 
Unions, the successor of the FOL, refused to mobilise for an industrial confrontation with the Bolger 
Government over the Employment Contracts Act. Since enactment of the ECA, the CTU has also 
been at pains to avoid industrial action that might constitute breaches of the Act. Can it seriously be 
proposed that the New Zealand union movement has benefited from this cautious strategy? Union 
membership continues to fall, workplace union organisation is in disarray if not collapsed in many 
former strongholds, and cynicism about unionism is widespread. Over the long term, passivity is far 
more damaging to the union movement than defeated upsurges, for it saps the very life from the 
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A CHRONOLOGY OF KEY EVENTS 
 
1935  
Jock Barnes arrives on the Auckland waterfront. 
Election of first Labour Government under Michael Savage. 
 
1937:  
Bureau system of engaging labour established in main ports. 
Union boycotts Japanese shipping in protest at invasion of China. 
 
1939 
Labour Government amends Industrial Concilitation and Arbitration Act to enable the Minister of 
Labour to deregister a striking union and to cancel relevant awards. 
Labour Government enacts Strike and Lockout Emergency Regulations. 
 
1940 
Waterfront Control Commission takes control of the wharves 
Kelly-Murray case 




Jim Roberts steps down as national secretary and is replaced by Toby Hill 
Barnes defeats Solomon for position as branch president 
 
1942 
American troops arrive at Auckland and Wellington 
Cuthbert and Solomon appointed to Waterfront Control Commission 
Disputes over Chios and Kartigi 
Labour Government enacts Economic Stabilisation Emergency Regulations 
 
1943 
Dispute over Waiana. 
Westfield freezing workers released from jail 
 
1944 
Jock Barnes defeats Jack Flood for national presidency 
Appointment of Jim O'Brien as Minister of Labour 
Kaikorai dispute over gangway 
Strike wave through New Zealand industry 
 
1946 
Dispute over Waterfront Commission decision on guaranteed wage 
Union imposes ban on Dutch shipping to Indonesia 
Retirement from office of O'Brien and appointment of Angus McLagan as Minister of Labour 
Boycott of wool for Barcelona in protest against Franco  
Walsh Economic stabilisation report 
 
1947 








Labour destroys Communist-led Carpenters Union 
Solidarity with Canadian seamen's strike 
Labour's conscription referendum 
Dispute over Barnhill 
Nationwide waterfront lockout  
Formation of New Zealand Port Employers Association 
National win the general election 
 
1950 
Royal Commission of Enquiry into the New Zealand waterfront established 





State of Emergency declared and Emergency Regulations promulgates 
WWU broken up and replaced by 26 port unions 
National win re-election 
National makes substantial amendments to Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act and the Police 
Offences Act and introduces the Union Funds Distribution Act, all of which severely penalise militant 
unionism. 
Barnes gaoled for 2 months hard labour for criminal libel 
 
1952  
Report of the Royal Commission. 
 
 
Source: Updated from Green (1996) 
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31 Arbitration Court hands down general wage rise of 15% 
  
FEBRUARY  
8 Negotiations with shipowners over pay rise on waterfront fail to reach agreement on 
pay rise for wharfies. 
13 WWU National Executive meets with shipowners: “final offer” of 4s7½d per day in 
response to WWU claim of 6s. 
14 Overtime ban imposed in response to employer offer. Employers threaten to dismiss 
all wharfies refusing overtime. 
16 WWU negotiating committee meets with Cabinet (Holyoake, Sullivan and Webb) and 
shipowners (Blakely, Marchington, Belford, Robertson, Congdon and Dobbie). 
17 Holland returns from Washington. 
19 Branches all confirm readiness to resist employer ultimatum. Employers lock out men 
refusing to work overtime. The “151 Days” begins. 
20 John Foster Dulles (US State Department) arrives in Auckland from Japan. 
21 Holland declares State of Emergency. Troops begin to work the wharves soon after. 
25 Meeting held in Christchurch attracts 1,500 to hear the watersiders’ case. 
26 Meeting of Trade Union Congress votes support for WWU. 
26 First Auckland WWU illegal bulletin issued, the first of several dozen over the 
following 5 months. 
27 Waikato and King Country miners, freezing workers, hydroelectric workers, Portland 
and Golden Bay cement workers, coolstore workers strike against Regulations and in 
defence of WWU, followed by blacking of scab cargo by railway workers and 
gasworkers. 
28 Deregistration of the WWU and seizure of union funds by Public Trustee. Ken Baxter 
(FOL President) denounces WWU actions. 
  
MARCH  
1-2 FP Walsh calls a meeting of affected unions at Trades Hall and insists that WWU 
accept binding arbitration on their claim. 
6 WWU negotiating committee, plus representatives from miners and freezing workers, 
meet Sullivan and Bert Bockett, secretary of the Department of Labour. Sullivan 
refuses to acknowledge Barnes and Hill as legitimate representatives of the wharfies, 
the WWU having been deregistered. 
7 Further meeting held between WWU and miners and freezing worker reps. WWU 
accepts binding arbitration in principle and nominates the other two unions to 
negotiate on its behalf. 
9 FOL Special Conference at Wellington Town Hall calls for the WWU to reject direct 
action in favour of conciliation and arbitration and votes for the convening of a 
conference involving all affected parties. FP Walsh subsequently attacks WWU 
leadership as Communist stooges and calls for the removal of Barnes and Hill as the 
WWU’s national leaders, 
12 First Wellington underground bulletin produced. 
13-15 Discussions between FOL Executive, Government and representatives of freezing 
workers and miners over the lockout. FOL attempts unsuccessfully to have the WWU 
hand over carriage of the dispute to it. Minister of Labour finally nominates the 
conditions for a return to work - the “Seven Points”, including “open” employment.  
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14 Government succeeds in establishing scab union at Whakatane. 
16 FOL Executive and seven other affected unions endorse the Government’s Seven 
Points. 
17 WWU rejects Government’s insistence on open employment and demands union 
maintain control over recruitment (while accepting several of the other Government 
conditions). Government responds by demanding permanent dismantling of the 
WWU. 
21 Extension of State of Emergency for a further month. 
21 FOL Executive calls upon workers to return to work and to handle blacked goods. 
Several key unions respond, including Auckland Drivers, Mangakino hydro workers 
and railway workers. 
29 Walter Nash calls for a compulsory conference to be convened and agrees that the 
Labour Government too would have used the Emergency Regulations at a public 
meeting in Hamilton, also attended by Ken Baxter. 
  
APRIL  
3 WWU National Council meets and reaffirms basic union demands; all rejected by the 
Government. 
5 Emergency strike committee established by rank and file mineworkers. Reaffirms 
blacking of coal production and distribution. Effective in Waikato, Buller and West 
Coast. 
7 Sullivan sends letters to the homes of every registered wharfie in New Zealand 
inviting him to return to work or be assumed to have abandoned employment on the 
waterfront. 
9 Auckland police unsuccessfully attempt to prevent meeting of WWU at Trades Hall. 
10 Seamen and Wellington drivers reaffirm decision to strike 
12 Walter Nash meets with the WWU negotiating committee and then makes 
representations to the Holland Government on behalf of the WWU. Barnes eventually 
accepts all Seven Points, including compulsory arbitration. 
20 Holland announces an “eighth point” as a condition of settlement of the dispute: that 
separate port unions be established and the national union be broken up. 
23 Public Trustee seizes funds of Wellington freezing and drivers unions and of Golden 
bay cement workers. 
24 FOL Conference decides to take no action against Emergency Regulations. 
30 Dynamiting of Huntly railway line in Waikato: no culprit ever found. 
30 Scab union formed in Auckland with 191 members. R.S. Belsham, “new union” 
president, attacked in his home. 
  
MAY  
1 Auckland Star editorial calls on Government to ban any gatherings by wharfies in the 
vicinity of the wharves, and for police to shoot at groups of workers who defy such a 
ban. Government extends Emergency Regulations to forbid “loitering” of strikers and 
sympathisers, and establishes a Civil Emergency Organisation, consisting of 
volunteers, to provide “essential duties”. 
2 March by Wellington wharfies broken up by police in Cuba Street. 
Early Scab union formed at Bluff following decision by Timaru WWU branch to return to 
work on employer conditions. 
3 Scab union members start work in Auckland: 5,000 wharfies and supporters 
demonstrate outside Town Hall. 
?? Shipowners announce a 50% increase in freight charges. 
4 Walter Nash issues a press statement complaining about suppression of free speech by 
the Government and police force. 
Editorial Preface 
11 Wellington branch leadership meets Minister of Labour to discuss Government’s 
conditions. Government further extends its Seven Conditions, now insisting on 
separate port unions, open employment, screening by employers, prohibition of 
“spelling”, and Government regulation of waterfront employment conditions through 
a series of nominees. Wellington rejects conditions. 
13 TUC convene a public rally of 9,000 in Auckland Domain: Nash declares that he is 
“neither for nor against” the wharfies. 
18 Bashings of wharfies in Queen Street and 9 arrests. 
18 Scab union formed in Dunedin 
20 Government temporarily lifts ban on members of the WWU addressing. public 
meetings. Mass public meetings follow in Auckland and Wellington Town Halls to 
hear WWU speakers present their case. 
21 Scab union formed in Lyttelton. 
24 Mass public meeting at Dunedin Town Hall 
28 Members of new scab union start work in Wellington. 
30 Joint meeting held between National Executives of FOL and Labour Party in fruitless 
attempt to work out a common policy on the lockout. 
  
JUNE  
1 “Bloody Friday”: police attack Queen Street demonstration of wharfies and their 
supporters in Auckland. 
3 17,000 gather in Auckland Domain to hear the WWU present its case. 3,000 attend 
public meeting in Wellington Town Hall. 
6 Mass public meeting in Christchurch Town Hall. Government re-imposes ban on 
WWU public meetings. 
6 Australian police raid offices of Australian Waterside Workers Federation (WWF) in 
Sydney and Melbourne in an attempt to destroy the leadership. Mass walkout by 
Sydney wharfies in protest. 
7 Port Chalmers votes to return to work. 
  
13 Australian WWF lifts ban on handling ships sailing with black cargo following 
condemnation of its stand by the ACTU and the threat of mass fines. 
13 Combined meeting of representatives from seamen, miners, freezing workers, drivers 
and labourers confirms resolution to fight until “honourable settlement” is reached. 
11-13 Labour Party holds annual conference in Christchurch. Delegates endorse stance of 
Labour Party and FOL Executive. 
13 W.F. McMullen, ex Grenadier Guards, elected President of the scab Auckland 
“Maritime Cargo Workers Union”.  
14 Freda Barnes appears on a charge of “inciting disorder”. Found guilty and fined on 22 
June. 
14 A full complement of scabs now at work in the port of Auckland, the Minister of 
Labour rejects any potential for former wharfies to return to their old jobs in 
Auckland on cessation of the dispute. 
21-22 Meetings by drivers and Waikato miners vows to continue the fight, but evidence of 
weakening amongst other mineworkers, railway workers and others. 
25 Wellington branch leadership engages in independent negotiations with Minister of 
Labour. Deadlock. 
26 Strike committee meets. Seamen advise WWU to return to work on Government’s 
terms. 




4 Mineworkers return to work. Lyttelton branch of the WWU votes to return to work 
but then reverses its decision awaiting a national outcome. 
9 National Strike Committee (seamen, watersiders, freezing workers, miners and 
drivers) votes to call off combined action. 
11 Seamen return to work. 
11 WWU National Executive votes to recommend a return to work. 
12 Holland announces early dissolution of Parliament to contest a general election. 
16 Watersiders return to work where they are able. Widespread victimisation in 
Auckland and Lyttelton. 
25 State of Emergency Regulations lifted. 
  
AUGUST  
2-3 Justice Jenner Wiley hears a case of criminal libel brought against Jock Barnes by 





1 Holland Government takes four seats from Labour as it wins re-election. 
12 Barnes’ appeal against sentence dismissed. 
  
OCTOBER  
3 WWU National Executive votes to wind up national union with Barnes in jail. 
  
NOVEMBER  






A WHO'S WHO 
 
Allum, Sir John Andrew: Mayor of Auckland 1941-53; Member of Council of Auckland Chamber 
of Commerce, 1923-63; KCMG 1950. 
 
Anderson, Captain James Alfred: manager Roose shipping company 
 
Baxter, Ken McLean: secretary Federation of Labour 1944-69; secretary of New Zealand Printing 
Union 1932-44. 
 
Berendsen, Sir Carl: New Zealand ambassador to USA, 1944-48; KCMG 1946. 
 
Bockett, Arthur Ernest: secretary of Waterfront Control Commission 1940; general manager of 
Waterfront Control Commission 1946; Chairman of Waterfront Control Commission 1948-51, 
KCMG 1974 
 
Bockett, Herbert Leslie: secretary of Department of Labour, 1947-64. KCMG 1968. Like his twin 
brother, Arthur, an accountant by training. 
 
Coates, Rt Hon. Joseph Gordon: Reform Member for Kaipara; Prime Minister 1925-28; Minister of 
Public Works, Transport and Unemployment (Coalition Government), 1931-35. 
 
Croskery, Alexander: vice president of FOL 1945-46; president of FOL 1946-52; secretary of 
Amalgamated Society of Shop Assistants for 25 years; vice president of Wellington Trades Council. 
 
Dalglish, Justice Douglas James: chairman Waterfront Commission 1947-48; chairman Waterfront 
Authority 1948-51; Deputy Judge, Court of Arbitration 1947-52; Judge of Compensation Court 1952- 
 
Forbes, Rt Hon. George William: Liberal then United Member for Hurunui; Prime Minister 1930-35 
(Coalition Government from September 1931).  
 
Fraser, Rt Hon Peter, Labour Member for Brooklyn; Prime Minister 1940-49; secretary of 
Parliamentary Labour Party 1919-35. 
 
Holland, Rt Hon. Sidney George, National Member for Fendalton; Prime Minister and Minister of 
Finance 1949-57; Opposition Leader 1940-49. 
 
Luxford, Justice John Hector: Principal stipendiary magistrate Auckland 1941-51; Mayor of 
Auckland 1953-56. 
 
McLagan, Angus: President of FOL 1937-46; secretary of Miners Federation 1927-46. Appointed  to 
Legislative Council and position as Minister of National Service and Industrial Manpower 1942. 
Resigned 1946 to successfully contest seat of Riccarton for Labour; Minister of Employment, Labour, 
Mines and Immigration 1946-49; member of Economic Stabilisation Commission 1940-45 
 
Minhinnick, George Edward: Cartoonist New Zealand Herald 1930-75; OBE 1950; KCMG 1976. 
 
Moohan, Michael: Secretary of Labour Party, 1940-47; Labour Member for Petone 1946-67.  
 
Nash, Rt Hon Walter: Labour MP for Hutt 1929-64; secretary of Labour Party, 1922-32; President 
of Labour Party 1935-36; Minister of Finance 1935-49; Deputy Prime Minister 1940-49; Leader of 
Opposition, 1950-57, 1960-63; Prime Minister 1957-60. 
Editorial Preface 
 
O'Brien, Rt Hon James, Labour MP 1928-46; Minister of Labour, 1945-46. 
 
Ongley, Hon Frederick William: Chairman Waterfront Industry Commission, 1946-47; Judge of 
Compensation Court from 1945. 
 
Price, Captain R.E.: President of Harbour Boards Association and Waterside Employers 
Association; member of Wellington Harbour Board for 23 years (13 as chairman). 
 
Roberts, Jim: secretary of Waterside Workers Union, 1915-41; secretary of Alliance of Labour: 
1920-35; vice president of Labour Party, 1934-37; national president of Labour Party 1937-50. 
Member of Waterfront Control Commission, 1940-46. 
 
Semple, Rt Hon Robert: Labour Member for Wellington East 1928-46 and then for Miramar; 
member of Savage and Fraser ministries as Minister of Works, 1935-49; published "Why I Fight 
Communism" 1948. 
 
Sullivan, Rt Hon William: National Member for Bay of Plenty 1941-57; Minister of Labour, 
Employment, Mines and Immigration 1949-57; KCMG 1957. 
 
Walsh, Fintan Patrick: vice president Federation of Labour 1946-47; 1948-53, then president 1953-
63; president of Seamen's Union 1927-63; president of Wellington Trades Council 1937-63; president 
of Wellington Clerical Workers Union 1936-63; member of Industrial Emergency Council during 
WW2; member of Economic Stabilisation Commission from inception until closure in 1950; member 
of War Assets Realisation Disposal Commission. 
 
Webb, Hon. Patrick Charles: Labour Member for Buller 1913-18; 1933-46, Minister of Mines, 
Labour and Telegraphs, 1935-45. 
 
 
Source: Who's Who in New Zealand 1932, 1941, 1951, 1961 
 
 
